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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LENGTH,
RESILIENCY, AND IMPACT OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS
Anthony Moffa
Since the rise of the modern administrative state we have seen a demonstrable trend towards lengthier regulations. However, popular critiques of the administrative state that focus on the overall size of the Federal Register are misguided.
They rest on the premise that more, and longer, regulations unduly burden industry and the economy in general. However, movement towards lengthier and more
detailed regulations could be rational and largely unproblematic. This study tests
two potential rational explanations for the trend towards longer regulations:
dubbed (1) “the insulation hypothesis” and (2) “the socially beneficial hypothesis.” Each of these explanations embodies a theoretically rational decision. First,
the insulation hypothesis rests on the idea that it would make sense for policymakers to include more detailed legal and scientific support in new regulations,
and thereby increase their length relative to previous regulations, if the additional detail provided more insulation from judicial review. Second, the socially beneficial hypothesis rests on the idea that devoting relatively more time and resources to each new rule would be appropriate if longer, newer regulations
produced more net social benefits than older, shorter ones. The empirical analysis set forth in this article combines data from a number of publicly available
sources to test these hypotheses. The results, confirming “the socially beneficial
hypothesis,” add to the canon of empirical analysis of administrative law, building on the work of Cass Sunstein, Cary Coglianese, and others. Recognizing an
overly burdensome regulatory state, an undoubtedly worthwhile and vital check
in a democratic society, requires more than simply counting the pages of regulations. The results of this study should put some minds at ease, at least with respect
to EPA regulations; they should also help better direct our scrutiny in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
“For many decades, an ever-growing maze of regs, rules, and restrictions has
cost our country trillions of dollars, millions of jobs, countless American factories, & devastated entire industries.”—President Donald J. Trump1
“The era of big government is over.”—President William J. Clinton2
A common criticism of the federal administrative state from presidents,
politicians, pundits, policymakers, and even scholars has been that there are
simply too many regulations. Often this criticism is accompanied by a theatric
numerical or physical depiction of the pages in the Code of Federal Regulations
or the Federal Register.3 Although these arguments have media appeal, they
1

Michal Kranz, Trump Cut Literal Red Tape While Standing Next to a Massive Pile of Paper to Make a Point About Big Government, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.busin
essinsider.com/trump-stood-next-to-a-huge-pile-of-paper-showing-big-government-2017-12
[https://perma.cc/C6HR-KEBQ].
2 William Jefferson Clinton, President, U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996),
available at https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.html [https://perma
.cc/QRR7-QQT4].
3 See, e.g., Steven J. Davis, Regulatory Complexity and Policy Uncertainty: Headwinds of
Our Own Making, HOOVER INSTITUTION 1, 1 (2017) (comparing the number of pages in the
Code of Federal Regulations to 133 King James Bibles); Kranz, supra note 1 (depicting
President Donald J. Trump next to large stacks of printed out pages).
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misconstrue the reality of the data,4 while asking and answering the wrong
question. It may be true that individual regulations have grown, and continue to
grow, increasingly complex and lengthy to read, adding pages to the Federal
Register at higher rates each year.5 Indeed, the data largely confirm the existence of such a trend.6 The movement towards longer and more detailed regulations could be rational,7 and unproblematic. Despite the fundamental importance of determining whether a relationship between length and some
measure of effectiveness exists, no prior empirical study has directly addressed
the issue.8
This study begins to fill that void by testing two hypothesized rational explanations for longer regulations: (1) “the insulation hypothesis” and (2) “the
socially beneficial hypothesis.”9 The insulation hypothesis posits that it makes
sense for policymakers to increase the length of new regulations relative to previous regulations because the additional pages provide more insulation from
judicial review. Regulations that consistently get overturned impose costs on
both the regulators and the regulated community, making the reduction of those
costs a rational goal. The socially beneficial hypothesis posits that using more
words for each new rule is appropriate because longer regulations produce
more net social benefits. In other words, if individual regulations have grown in
order to increase the net social benefits they provide or to better insulate them
from judicial review, then the trend towards longer rules would be justified. If,
on the other hand, regulations have become needlessly loquacious, then perhaps
a change of course is in order.
This paper attempts to answer the question of the trend’s rationality in
terms of resilience and quantified benefits of administrative rules in the context
of environmental regulations. The analysis relies on data compiled by the Office of the Federal Register10 and QuantGov11 to prove the existence of a trend;
4

See infra Part II (revealing that the number of rules added to the Federal Register each year
has actually decreased over time).
5 See Davis, supra note 3, at 1. For example, the Clean Power Plan, finalized by the Environmental Protection Agency on August 3, 2015 and published in the Federal Register on
October 23, 2015, comprised over 300,000 words (data on file with author).
6 See infra Figure 3 (demonstrating the increasing number of pages per rule over time).
7 The term “rational” throughout means an administrative process that functions optimally
in terms of the costs and benefits of the process itself—the value of the regulation for society
is produced with the least wasted effort. In other words, an irrational administrative process
would be one that utilizes more labor to produce regulations than is necessary to render those
regulations effective for their underlying purpose and as resilient as possible.
8 See infra Part I (discussing the empirical scholarship in the field and identifying this gap in
the literature).
9 These are just two potential rational explanations for crafting longer and more detailed
regulations. Part I will discuss why these two explanations stand out for empirical analysis
and serve as the focus of this piece.
10 See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL REGISTER STATISTICS (2018), https://www.
federalregister.gov/reader-aids/understanding-the-federal-register/federal-register-statistics
[https://perma.cc/QHT4-ZPUW].
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the words and pages of the regulatory texts themselves to provide the data
points on length; the regulatory impact and cost benefit analyses prepared by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide quantified social impacts; and United States Courts of Appeal and United States Supreme Court
opinions in cases reviewing EPA regulations to indicate likelihood of reversal.
Applying a neutral, empirical lens, through which to evaluate the trend towards
increasingly complex rulemaking, benefits administrative agencies, courts, and
commentators by grounding discussions of reform.
Environmental regulations constitute a significant portion of the pages of
the Code of Federal Regulations and the Federal Register that political actors
like to pile up for visuals.12 The EPA consequently takes the brunt of the popular criticism aimed at the expansive government bureaucracy and the pervasive
administrative state.13 Rulemakings initiated by the EPA provide an important
set of data on which to test the correlations that suggest rational explanations
for the growing length and complexity of administrative rules. In addition to
presenting empirical evidence on the perceived trend of increasing length of
regulations over time, this study tests for correlations related to the hypotheses
described above to determine whether or not longer regulations signal a move
to a less effective and more inefficient, in other words irrational, administrative
state. Ultimately, the results, reported in full below, supported one of the two
primary hypotheses—the socially beneficial hypothesis. The study found a robust, statistically significant positive correlation between the number of words
in a final rule and the EPA’s estimated net social benefits of that rule.
Part I locates this study within the existing body of empirical legal scholarship on administrative law. Part II begins the analysis by examining the trend
towards longer regulations across all agencies in more detail, looking at all of
the rules proposed and finalized in the Federal Register over time. Part III explains why the correlations tested herein are of particular interest. It discusses
how the potential relationship between the length of rules and the rate of success on judicial review is consistent with the theses of some administrative law
scholars regarding the behavior of agencies and administrators. From the policymakers’ perspective, this part highlights how the potential relationship between the length of rules and their net social benefit is consistent with political
11

QuantGov is an open-source platform that compiles data up to date on regulatory text,
pulling from, among other sources, the eCFR. See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver
Sherouse, QuantGov—a Policy Analytics Platform, QUANTGOV (Dec. 20, 2017).
12 See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, RegData US 3.1 Annual (dataset),
QUANTGOV (2018), https://quantgov.org/regdata-us/ [https://perma.cc/32JR-XW39] (last
visited Jan. 6, 2020) (reporting the number of words added to the CFR by each agency every
year from 1970–2017 in the “RegData 3.1 Agency Summary” subset).
13 Arthur Pugsley, The Myth of EPA Overregulation, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 475, 478 (2012) (“A
near-universal chorus on the political right, including elected officials and interest groups,
has objected to the EPA as overregulating and thereby causing economic harm. Moreover,
some Democrats have supported the effort to cut back on EPA regulations for the same reason.”).

20 NEV. L.J. 733

Spring 2020]

WORD LIMITED

737

statements about rulemakings. Part IV presents the methodology, findings, and
analysis regarding the first hypothesized correlation; Part V presents the methodology, findings, and analysis regarding the second. Part VI further explores
some other potential explanations for the initially observed trend towards longer regulations, as well as suggests areas for future study. Part VII discusses implications of the findings for courts, policymakers, and scholars. Part VIII explicitly acknowledges the limitations of this study.
I.

PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Other scholars have endeavored to empirically examine the changes in the
regulatory state in the modern era. Cornelius Kerwin and Scott Furlong conducted a study that, like this work, attempted to demonstrate and explain a
trend towards more complex regulations.14 However, rather than focusing on
the length of individual rules, Kerwin and Furlong chose to study the duration
from proposed rule to final rule.15 Specifically, they compiled data from the
EPA’s internal regulatory tracking system on 150 non-routine rules promulgated between October 1, 1986, and September 30, 1989.16 Kerwin and Furlong
then tested empirically (using proxies) some of the hypotheses prevalent in
scholarship purporting to explain the variance in the passage of time from proposal to final rule.17 Overall, the regression models they constructed explained
14

Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R. Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of
Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 113, 130–31 (1992).
15 See id. at 121.
16 Id. at 122.
17 Kerwin and Furlong described their methods, in part, as follows:
We sought to develop measures to capture the complexity of subject matter, as well as the legal,
bureaucratic, and political constraints.
We were unable to measure directly the effects of complex subject matter on elapsed time because developing and applying objective measures proved too difficult; we used instead two admittedly crude indicators. First, we classified rules by program office to determine whether the
general subject matter (e.g., air, water, or toxic substances) had any effect on elapsed time and,
hence, on delay. Second, we considered the length of the rule, measured by the number of columns it occupies in the Federal Register . . . .
The effect of legal constraints was measured in several ways. Classifying rules by program office helped account for different procedural requirements written into authorizing statutes. We
also included a measure of the potential impact of the rule—whether it was classified as major,
significant, or minor—because these are associated with varying legal requirements as to the
form of mandatory analyses . . . Because of its prominence in the literature and in policy debates,
we also included OMB review time as a separate independent variable . . . .
We measured in several ways bureaucratic factors that potentially influence the amount of time
it takes to issue a rule. The number of participants in the rulemaking workgroup was a measure
of organization complexity. . . . Finally, because the literature suggests that delay is reduced
when senior agency management makes expeditious rulemaking a priority, we used an independent variable to account for creation of an agency steering committee as a mechanism for
better central management of the rulemaking.
The political constraints on rulemaking, like the complexity of the subject matter, are difficult to
measure with accuracy, so we again employed a surrogate: the number of public comments received on the proposed rule.
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approximately half of the variance in duration of the rulemaking process—a
noteworthy result.18 The results confirmed empirically that the length of time
for an EPA rule to go from proposed to final depends, at least to some significant extent, on such variables as: the complexity of the regulated subject, the
statutory process and evidentiary requirements, the bureaucracy involved, and
political pressure on the agency.19 One might reasonably expect that those same
factors would affect the length of a given rule, in addition to its time to promulgation.
Indeed, some of those factors are closely related to the hypotheses tested
herein; for example, political pressure and statutory requirements (specifically
those enshrined in the Administrative Procedure Act) directly relate to whether
and how a rule would be subject to judicial review.20 Other individual variables
they tested seem more closely connected to internal agency time and priority
management than to the length of a given rule. On a granular level, only one
specific variable—the variable used to measure the attention a rule receives
from high-level agency officials—proved significant in all three of Kerwin and
Furlong’s models.21 That finding “lends support to anecdotal reports and professional opinion regarding the positive effects on rule-making of agencyleadership attention.”22 From both an intuitive and empirical perspective, the
attention of agency leadership on a particular rulemaking suggests that the rule
will be finalized in more timely fashion; however, one cannot say the same
about the effect that the attention of leadership might have on the final rule’s
length.
One important assumption underlying the hypotheses tested here is that
longer regulations require more agency resources to complete. Kerwin and Furlong’s results both support and challenge that assumption. Supporting that assumption is their finding that the number of participants in work groups was
not a significant predictor of the length of time from proposed to final rule, and
to the extent it was related, the correlation was negative, suggesting that devoting additional full-time employees (FTEs) to a rule sped up its promulgation.23
Id. at 120–21.
18 See id. at 130 (reporting that “[t]he models used account for between 41 and 57 percent of
the variance in elapsed time, and all models proved to be statistically significant.”).
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (“Agency action made
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in
a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency
action. Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or determined
an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless the agency
otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.”).
21 Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 131.
22 Id.
23
See id.
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Kerwin and Furlong also tested one measure of length—number of columns in
the Federal Register entry—as a predictor of duration, but did not find a statistically significant relationship.24 Taken together, those findings suggest that additional resources, in the form of FTEs, could be devoted to specific rulemakings based on something other than the schedule—perhaps the length and
complexity of the rule. A devotion of resources in that manner, particularly if
those resources assist in moving the process along, would explain why a rule’s
length is not a good predictor of the time it takes for that rule to be finalized.
On the other hand, the findings with respect to the lack of a relationship between the length of a rule and duration of the process might suggest that longer
rules are not necessarily more work.
A host of prominent scholars have empirically studied judicial review of
administrative agency decisions.25 The design of these studies informed the
methods employed here. The findings of these studies, particularly with respect
to the rates of reversal, prove especially relevant to the analysis of findings on
the “insulation hypothesis.”26 Because of these forerunners, there exists a foundation upon which to build this study. Although some of these scholars attempted to explain what drives judicial review decisions,27 none of them sought
to examine the potential relationship between the length of rules and the likelihood of their reversal or remand. Thus, this work fills that important gap.

24

Id.
See, e.g., James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the
Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1679–80 (1999);
Kiki Caruson & J. Michael Bitzer, At the Crossroads of Policymaking: Executive Politics,
Administrative Action, and Judicial Deference by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals (1985–
1996), 26 LAW & POL’Y 347, 349 (2004); Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of
Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV 767, 769 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2007);
Martha Anne Humphries & Donald R. Songer, Law and Politics in Judicial Oversight of
Federal Administrative Agencies, 61 J. POL. 207, 211–12 (1999); Orin S. Kerr, Shedding
Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. REG. 1, 4 (1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 765–66 (2008) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein,
Real World]; Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825 (2006) [hereinafter Miles &
Sunstein, Empirical Investigation]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An Empirical
Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515,
519 (2011); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 988 (1990); David H. Willison,
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions: Agency Cases Before the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, 1981–84, 14 AM. POL. Q. 317, 318 (1986).
26 See infra Part II (explaining the hypotheses tested in this study).
27 For example, Miles and Sunstein, in both of their prominent empirical studies of judicial
review of agencies, focus on determining whether politics of judges, and of administrators,
have a significant effect on the outcome. See Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25,
at 781; Miles & Sunstein, Empirical Investigation, supra note 25, at 869–70.
25
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II. GROWTH OF REGULATIONS
By the end of 2016, the Federal Register encompassed just over 97,000
pages, including over 60,000 devoted to final and proposed rules.28 According
to QuantGov, as of January 9, 2020, there were a total of 103,167,288 words in
the Code of Federal Regulations.29 These staggering numbers grow yearly,
providing cannon fodder for the “regulatory reform” advocates in the popular
media and the academy. However, the data present a more complicated picture.
Contrary to the contentions of some prominent scholars,30 the regulatory
state has not “ossified”31—at least not according to the data. Cary Coglianese
first exposed the lack of empirical support for the ossification hypothesis in
2008.32 Coglianese used simple data from the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) and the Federal Register to demonstrate that “the regulatory state has increased considerably in size and impact since the establishment of the APA and
subsequent reforms, including OMB review.”33 According to Coglianese’s
findings, the CFR has grown by a multiple of five since 1946, without demonstrating any appreciable slowdown in growth since the advent of OMB review.34 In fact, he found that, in 2006, the CFR contained approximately 33
percent more pages than it did in 1980.35 Coglianese also reported that from
approximately 1986 to 2006, the Federal Register included “about 4,000 new
rules each year.”36 This work begins by updating and more closely examining
this last figure.
28

OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, FEDERAL REGISTER & CFR PUBLICATION STATISTICS—
AGGREGATED CHARTS—AGGREGATED CHARTS (2016), https://www.federalregister.gov/
uploads/2017/04/stats2016Fedreg.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4DP-UWZT]. Under Section 553
of the Administrative Procedure Act, “[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register,” followed by a period of public comment, before a rule issues
and becomes effective (i.e., becomes a “final” rule). 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2018).
29 The QuantGov Team, The QuantGov Regulatory Clock, QUANTGOV, https://quantgov.org
/charts/the-quantgov-regulatory-clock/ [https://perma.cc/38DN-VULX] (last visited Jan. 9,
2020).
30 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is
Real: A Response to Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1494
(2012).
31 The term “ossification” has been used by scholars over the last three decades to describe a
perceived decline in regulatory activity. See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee,
Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume
and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1418 n.18 (2012) (reporting that the
term “ossification” produced over 1000 hits in a search of documents in Westlaw’s Journals
and Law Reviews database).
32 Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 85,
92 (2008) [hereinafter Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality].
33 Id. at 91.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36
Id.
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The reported Federal Register data indicates that these large numbers are
not simply the result of an increasingly active administrative state over time, at
least in terms of rules proposed and finalized.37 As Figure 1 shows, the number
of rules added to the Federal Register each year has actually decreased over the
period for which data is available.38
FIGURE 1

MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

1
.865a
.749
.735
a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined, Proposed Rules

Std. Error of the
Estimate
6.163

Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.864a

.746

.740

6.114

a. Predictors: (Constant), Combined

The regression model presented in Figure 1 demonstrates that the year
serves as a fairly strong predictor of the number of proposed and final rules
added to the Federal Register. The R-square numbers indicate that the regres-

37
38

See FEDERAL REGISTER STATISTICS, supra note 10.
See infra Figure 1.
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sion model explains almost three-quarters of the variance in the data.39 That is a
comparatively strong result40 consistent with Coglianese’s observations.41
Over that same period, the length of each rule added to the Federal Register
has steadily increased.42 According to the Office of the Federal Register, the
number of pages devoted to rules each year in the Federal Register has actually
increased, despite the decline in the number of individual rules demonstrated
above.43 Figure 2 presents this data graphically and again reports a statistically
significant relationship, with the model accounting for approximately 68 percent of the variance.
FIGURE 2

39

IBM, R-Squared Statistics, https://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgeceter/en/SSLVMB
_25.0.0/statistics_casestudies_project_ddita/spss/tutorials/log_loan_rsquare.html[https://per
ma.cc/LRN9-VD4P] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020) (“In the linear regression model, the coefficient of determination, R2, summarizes the proportion of variance in the dependent variable
associated with the predictor (independent) variables, with larger R2 values indicating that
more of the variation is explained by the model, to a maximum of 1. For regression models
with a categorical dependent variable, it is not possible to compute a single R2 statistic that
has all of the characteristics of R2 in the linear regression model, so these approximations are
computed instead. The following methods are used to estimate the coefficient of determination. . . . What constitutes a ‘good’ R2 value varies between different areas of application.
While these statistics can be suggestive on their own, they are most useful when comparing
competing models for the same data. The model with the largest R2 statistic is ‘best’ according to this measure.”).
40 See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 130 (describing r-squares of 41 to 57 as a “modest” results).
41 See Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 32, at 92.
42 See infra Figure 3.
43
See FEDERAL REGISTER STATISTICS, supra note 10.
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MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

1
.826a
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year

R Square

Adjusted R Square

.682

.673

Std. Error of the
Estimate
2861.565

Combining the two sets of data yields an important figure for this study—
the number of pages per rule.44 During the 1970s, in the early years of the Environmental Protection Agency and in the midst of the social regulation era, each
new final or proposed rule (across all agencies) accounted for about two Federal Register pages.45 Since then, that figure has nearly quintupled to almost ten
Federal Register pages for each new rule (across all agencies).46 Furthermore,
that pages per rule figure has been relatively, steadily increasing over time.47
Figure 3 depicts these results graphically and presents a regression model quantifying the strength of the relationship between pages per rule and year of the
rule’s promulgation.
Interestingly, this model performs the best of the three with respect to its
R-square result. Over 90 percent of the variance in pages per rule can be explained by the year that the rule was promulgated, with newer rules (i.e., higher-numbered years) comprising more pages than older rules (i.e., lowernumbered years). Again, this result confirms Coglianese’s contention that the
regulatory state has not ossified, but also demonstrates that the nature of individual rulemakings has changed over time.

44

The pages per rules figures derive from dividing the “Rules Pages” in a given Federal
Register year (see supra Figure 2) by the number of “Final Rules” published in that same
year (see supra Figure 1).
45 See infra Figure 3.
46 See infra Figure 3.
47 The general phenomenon of increasing length of rules since the 1970s was first observed
and remarked upon by Jerry Mashaw in 1994, and, as the data here demonstrate in more precise detail, the trend has continued in the intervening two-plus decades. See Jerry L.
Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management,
Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 197 n.38 (1994) (“Constant or
modestly increasing pages in the Federal Register rules sections combined with declining
numbers of documents in those same sections lead to an obvious conclusion: the average
length of documents filed with the Federal Register has been increasing from the mid 1970s
until the present. Indeed, simple computation reveals that the average number of pages in the
rules section of the Federal Register in 1991 as a percentage of that same average in 1975 is
218 [percent]. The parallel percentage for the proposed rules sections is 225 [percent].”).
Mashaw’s work set out to determine whether “policymaking by rule has become moribund
or ‘ossified’ as some have argued” and, if so, “to reconsider the structure of agency rulemaking as a mechanism of governance, quite apart from that mechanism’s substantive effects in
particular instances.” Id. at 187.

20 NEV. L.J. 733

744

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

FIGURE 3

MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

1
.958a
.918
a. Predictors: (Constant), Year

Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the
Estimate
.916
.54152

As this foundational data demonstrates, there can be little dispute that the
individual regulations all agencies have been putting in place have become
wordier over time.48 The empirical and logical analyses in the parts that follow
reflect an effort to discern why.
48

The data compiled and presented here do conflict to some degree with data presented in
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 940 Chart 6 (2008). Specifically, O’Connell
graphically presents the number of Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRMs) over time as
an indicator of regulatory activity. See id. O’Connell’s data does not show a decline in
NPRMs over time, which contrasts with the decline in rules and proposed rules over time
reported by the Office of the Federal Register and analyzed above. Id. There are a few potential explanations for the discrepancy, the first of which being that NPRMs have not historically been issued for every rulemaking. The second explanation has to do with the composition of O’Connell’s dataset, which she constructed using “federal agency reports in the
Unified Agenda, which is published twice a year in the Federal Register, from 1983 to
2003.” Id. at 924. These reports included agency-provided information on rulemakings, including the date of the NPRM, “the date(s) of the comment period(s), [and] the date [of] the
final rule” or withdrawal. Id. As O’Connell herself concedes, the database “has some disadvantages” the most significant of which being that the information included in the Unified
Agenda is all self-reported by the agencies. Id. at 927. Particularly relevant to the focus of
this piece, at least one prominent scholar, Jerry Mashaw, contends that “[t]he EPA . . . does
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III. HYPOTHESES TESTED (AND UNTESTED)
As explained in brief above, the aim of this work is to test two potential
explanations for crafting longer regulations: (1) “the insulation hypothesis” and
(2) “the socially beneficial hypothesis.” Each of these explanations embodies a
theoretically rational decision on the part of administrators allocating resources.
First, the insulation hypothesis posits that it makes sense for policymakers to
include more detailed legal and scientific support in new regulations, and
thereby increase their length relative to previous regulations, because the additional detail provides more insulation from judicial review. In other words,
more resources devoted to writing a longer rule are well spent if they better
protect the rule from invalidation by a court. Second, the socially beneficial hypothesis posits that devoting relatively more resources to each new rule is appropriate because longer regulations produce more net social benefits. In other
words, a new rule being twice as long as an older rule is just as efficient (in
terms of the costs associated with drafting and publishing) if it is also twice as
beneficial to society. The analyses that follow attempt to test these hypotheses
by looking for statistically significant correlations in the data.49
The universe of possible reasons for the trend observed in Part I is much
broader than the two hypotheses that this work seeks to test empirically. Many
of these potential explanations, however, would prove difficult to empirically
test. For example, one potential explanation for regulations increasing in length
over time is that the subjects of rulemaking have become increasingly complex
and sophisticated over that same time period,50 necessitating more detailed regulations to prevent workarounds and reach all elements of the regulated industries. Another such difficult-to-test hypothesis would be that policymakers have
become more risk averse or better educated over time. One could hypothesize
that with increased risk aversion or years in higher education, rule-writers
would tend towards lengthier, more complex proposals. In contrast, the insulation and socially beneficial hypotheses present two opportunities for empirical
study based on the available data from court decisions and the EPA’s mandated
cost-benefit analyses.
not report any rulemaking activity that it considers insignificant [to be included in the Unified Agenda].” Mashaw, supra note 47, at 198 n.41. O’Connell explicitly disputes Mashaw’s
account but does ultimately agree with his contention “that it is not feasible ‘for the untutored eye to discern from the reporting in the Unified Agenda . . . whether activity levels are
primarily in a regulatory or deregulatory direction.’ ” O’Connell, supra, at 928 (quoting
Mashaw, supra note 47, at 198 n.41).
49 Statistical significance refers to the confidence that a correlation (positive or negative)
found in the data is not the product of random variation. This work will utilize a confidence
level of 95 percent to define statistical significance. See Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Statistical Significance, HARVARD. BUS. REV. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/02/a-refresheron-statistical-significance.
50 Cf. H. Jeffrey Leonard, Confronting Industrial Pollution in Rapidly Industrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls, and Opportunities, 12 ECO. L.Q. 779, 780–81 (1985) (describing how
industrialization leads to increasing complexity in sources of industrial pollution).

20 NEV. L.J. 733

746

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

Still other potential explanations were not the focus of this piece due to the
lack of significant implications for law and policy; though some of those potential explanations are explored briefly.51 For example, one reason for longer regulations might simply be improvement in technology on which the regulations
are drafted (i.e., personal and laptop computers).52
The insulation and socially beneficial hypotheses, whether proved or disproved by the data, could influence how closely courts scrutinize rules in the
future and how agencies allocate their limited rulemaking resources. These are
but a few of the numerous other explanations, some of which may indeed deserve study.53 Nonetheless, the results testing these two explanations provide an
opportunity to expand the critical conversation around regulatory reform.
The hypotheses selected here stand out as important for empirical study
because they are consistent with the statements made by policymakers in promotion of new rules54 and the analyses of those rules by some administrative
law scholars.55 Both groups tend to point to the erosion of deference by courts
(i.e., the need to provide more information and support to insulate rules from
judicial invalidation) and to the economic significance of new major rules (i.e.,
the massive net benefits of longer, more recent rules, as compared to older,
shorter rules).56

51

See infra Part V.
See Lois Mayer Nichols, Pencil and Paper Versus Word Processing: A Comparative
Study of Creative Writing in the Elementary School, 29 J. RES. ON COMPUTING EDUC. 159,
160 (1996) (finding, in a study of elementary school students, that those using computers
wrote compositions with significantly more words and sentences than those writing with
pencil and paper).
53 See infra Part V for some suggestions regarding future areas of study.
54 See, e.g., Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President in Announcing the
Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-clean-power-plan [https://perma.cc/T2GN-FS9X]
(describing the Clean Power Plan as “a plan two years in the making, and the single most
important step America has ever taken in the fight against global climate change.”).
55 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1111, 1130 (2002) (describing the “ossification hypothesis, which supposes that agencies have to work harder to produce rules that will withstand judicial scrutiny.”) [hereinafter
Coglianese, Empirical Analysis]; Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons
for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 412 (1987) (analogizing the statement of basis
and reasons provided by an agency in a rulemaking to judicial opinion writing, “giv[ing] a
‘reasoned elaboration’ for . . . actions according to norms of consistent, neutral and candid
decisional processes.”).
56
See infra Parts IV and V.
52
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IV. THE INSULATION HYPOTHESIS
A. Introduction
The first potential correlation this work will investigate is the relationship
between the length of a rule (measured in Federal Register pages) and the fate
of that rule on judicial review. Such an analysis is of interest because it is now
common practice in Federal Register entries for agencies to explain in painstaking detail the components of the administrative record, and even the legal analysis, supporting a particular rulemaking.57 Some commentators have analogized
this function of the administrative record to judicial opinion writing, which
“give[s] a ‘reasoned elaboration’ for [] actions according to norms of consistent, neutral and candid decisional processes.”58 It is quite possible that
agencies, and their counsel, have determined that explaining the reasoning behind an agency action in the public record, rather than just before a court,
makes that action less likely to be deemed “arbitrary and capricious” under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).59
Judicial review of agency action is confined, except for a few narrow exceptions, to the administrative record.60 The record includes much more than
the text of the rule itself, but agencies still use the Federal Register entry for a
rule to explain in detail the specific record components they are relying on. For
example, when the EPA published the “endangerment finding” with respect to
greenhouse gases, it stated “[t]he major assessments by the U.S. Global Climate
Research Program (USGCRP), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), and the National Research Council (NRC) serve as the primary scientific basis supporting the Administrator’s endangerment finding.”61 The notice
did not stop there; it included an entire section devoted to explaining why those
studies “compellingly support[ed]”62 the finding63 and directed the reader to its
“Technical Support Document (TSD)” summarizing the major assessments

57

See, e.g., Repeal of the Clean Power Plan and Revisions to Emissions Guidelines, 84 Fed.
Reg. 32, 520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (including two separate sections heavily laden with legal analysis, one laying out the legal basis for repeal of the Clean
Power Plan and another laying out the authority for the regulation of electric generating
units).
58 Shapiro & Levy, supra note 55, at 412.
59 See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
60 Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“If the record before the
agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the
basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to
the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”).
61 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,497 (Dec. 15, 2009).
62 Id.
63
See id.
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listed.64 The section explaining the EPA’s scientific analysis concluded with a
statement emphasizing the reasonableness of the EPA’s reliance on the aforementioned assessments.65
The data collected and analyzed here focus specifically on “arbitrary and
capricious review” of the substance of EPA rules, as distinct from the review of
the EPA’s interpretation of statutory mandates pursuant to Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.66 Separating empirical analyses of cases applying
these two standards of review is consistent with the approach taken by Thomas
Miles and Cass Sunstein.67 Not only is it empirically sound, but logically consistent with the hypothesis tested. As described above, the insulation hypothesis
embodies an approach to rulemaking that justifies long and detailed rules by
pointing to courts’ increasingly searching inquiries into the scientific and economic rationale for those rules. The APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” clause
provides the basis for such review.68 In contrast, the Chevron deference doctrine concerns the statutory authority for a given rule, rather than the rationale
underlying its substance.69
Under the APA, an agency action is unlawful if it is “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”70 As the Supreme Court has noted, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency
based its decision on a consideration of “the relevant factors” or whether it
made “a clear error of judgment.”71 Such a determination necessarily entails a
“searching and careful” fact-specific inquiry, but “the ultimate standard of re64

Id. at 66,497 n.1.
Id. at 66,511 (“In summary, EPA concludes that its reliance on existing and recent synthesis and assessment reports is entirely reasonable and allows EPA to rely on the best available science.”).
66 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 862 (1984)
(the Supreme Court famously laid out the boundaries of agencies’ discretion in interpreting
their statutory mandates and acting upon those interpretations).
67 Compare Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 766 (analyzing arbitrariness
review), with Miles & Sunstein, Empirical Investigation, supra note 25, at 825 (analyzing
the application of Chevron deference).
68 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
69 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“ ‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the
making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’ ” (quoting Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))).
70 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The APA, as interpreted by the courts, also imposes a number of
other requirements on rulemaking in § 553, including statements about legal authority, data
supporting the rulemaking, an opportunity for public comment, responses to material comments, and a defense of the final rulemaking as rationale and as a logical outgrowth of the
proposed rule. See id. § 553(b)–(c); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.
1977).
71 Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (citations omitted).
65
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view is a narrow one.”72 “The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment
for that of the agency.”73
The Supreme Court has provided some much-needed context to this rather
amorphous standard over the years. The most commonly cited definition, from
the Court’s opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United
States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,74 holds that the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard is violated when:
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is
so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product
of agency expertise.75

A number of scholars have previously conducted studies of judicial review
of administrative action.76 For a time, the scholarly, and political, consensus
settled on a figure of 80 percent for the percentage of final rules that became
the subject of judicial review.77 Cary Coglianese conducted a study to challenge
that conventional wisdom and ultimately concluded that only about one quarter
of the EPA rules are challenged in court.78 A similar study, conducted by Stephen Johnson,79 limited the pool of final rules to those designated as “significant”80 by the EPA between 2001 and 2005 and found that over 40 percent of

72

Id.
Id.
74 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983).
75 Id. at 43.
76 See supra text accompanying note 25.
77 For a list of sources claiming that litigants challenge 80 percent of the rules that EPA issues see Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1343–49 (1997). See also William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Negotiation: A New Way of Winning, Address to Conservation Foundation’s
Second National Conference on Environmental Dispute Resolution (Oct. 1, 1984), cited in
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 134 (1985) (stating that almost 80 percent of the agency’s major
rules were challenged while he was EPA Administrator).
78 See Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 55, at 1129 (“data reveal that the actual
rate is only about 26 [percent], and that even the most significant rules are subject to petitions for review only about 35 [percent] the time”).
79 Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemaking
from 2001–2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 768–71 (2008).
80 An Executive Order dictated how the agency was to define significance:
73

Significant regulatory action” means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that
may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment,
public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency;
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them were challenged in court.81 Further constraining the sample to only “economically significant”82 rules, Johnson found that the percentage subject to judicial review rose to 75 percent (approaching the 80 percent consensus figure).83
Scholars have directed their attention not only to the likelihood of judicial
review, but also, perhaps more importantly, to the rate at which courts reverse
or remand agency action. Prior to Coglanese’s and Johnson’s works described
above, Don Elliott and Peter Schuck conducted the seminal study of judicial
review of agency action.84 Elliott and Schuck, reviewing data from reported
opinions of federal appellate courts from 1965, 1975, 1984, and 1985, found
that approximately 44 percent of rulemakings succeeded on judicial review
(suggesting some 56 percent of rules reviewed were reversed or remanded to
the agency).85 Other scholars, particularly those associated with the regulatory
reform movement, often cite Elliott and Schuck’s figure as evidence of a problem.86 Subsequent studies tend to support a lower rate of reversal, however. In
another landmark study, Martha Humphries and Donald Songer compiled and
analyzed a comprehensive database of opinions from United States Courts of
Appeals from 1969 to 1988, finding a success rate of 58 percent for all agency
decisions (suggesting some 42 percent of rules reviewed were reversed or re-

(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or
the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or
the principles set forth in this Executive order.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
81 Johnson, supra note 79, at 785 (“Seventy percent of the significant rules that were challenged were issued under the Clean Air Act and more than 80 [percent] of the challenges
were brought in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit”).
82 Economically significant rules are those rules subject to more stringent Office of Management and Budget review as “significant” by virtue of “hav[ing] an annual effect on the
economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect the economy in a material way.” Id. at
776 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738).
83 Id. at 785 (“Half of the challenged rules were issued under the Clean Air Act and more
than 90 [percent] of the challenges were brought in the D.C. Circuit.”).
84 Schuck & Elliott, supra note 25, at 1007. As the title of their work suggests, Elliott and
Schuck focused their analysis on the effect of the Chevron doctrine. However, their general
figures regarding success rates of agency rulemakings in federal courts remain relevant to
the discussion of all standards of judicial review.
85 Id. at 1022 (“When the 1965, 1975, and 1984–85 data for reported opinions from all
agencies are combined, a systematic difference in success rates emerges: Adjudications have
enjoyed a long-term success rate of 57.8 [percent] (625 of 1082 cases), compared to only
43.9 [percent] (25 of 57) for rulemakings—in other words, the success rate for rulemaking
has been only three-quarters that for adjudications.”).
86 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REV. 59, 84 (1995) (citing Elliott and Schuck to support a claim that courts uphold less than
50 percent of the legislative rules under the arbitrary and capricious standard). Johnson then
subsequently wrote that “most empirical studies have found courts invalidate the rules in 30
[percent]–40 [percent] of the cases.” Johnson, supra note 79, at 773.
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manded to the agency).87 More recently, Coglianese reported finding that federal appellate courts uphold the agency decision in approximately half of the
cases.88
As many have noted, the success rate on judicial review can vary significantly by administrative agency.89 Relevant to the analysis here, some prominent studies have focused, at least in part, on the performance of EPA decisions
when subject to judicial review. A contemporary of Elliott and Schuck, David
Willison, found that for EPA decisions reviewed by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia between 1981 and 1984, the success rate was slightly
higher 59 percent.90 In 1994, James Hamilton and Christopher Schroeder examined a subset of EPA rules (only those issued pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA))91 and found that approximately 22 percent
of those rules had been subject to a court remand or consent decree (meaning
78 percent survived review).92 More recently, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein
analyzed the published opinions of United States Courts of Appeals over a tenyear period from 1996 to 2006 involving review of EPA and National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) “decisions either for arbitrariness or for lack of substantial evidence.”93 Miles and Sunstein found that “the overall rate of votes to
validate agency decisions challenged as arbitrary is 64 percent.”94 Similarly,
87

Humphries & Songer, supra note 25, at 215.
See Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 55, at 1129 (“After petitions for review
are filed challenging EPA rules, only about 29 [percent] of them ever result in a decision of
an appellate panel. Voluntary settlement, it turns out, is a common means of disposing of
judicial review litigation. Moreover, in those cases that do result in judges’ decisions on the
merits, in at least half of the cases the agency decision is upheld entirely.”).
89 See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon & Michael Giles, Recurring Litigants: Federal Agencies Before the Supreme Court, 25 W. POL. Q. 183, 184 (1972) (reporting that agency success rates
before the Supreme Court range from 56 percent to 91 percent); Donald W. Crowley, Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the Type of Agency Matter?, 40 W. POL. Q.
265, 271 (1987) (finding that agencies classified as “economic” have a 79 percent success
rate versus a 68 percent success rate for those classified as “social”); Roger Handberg, The
Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies: 1965–1978, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 161, 168 (1979)
(reporting similar agency success rates ranging from 55 percent to 91 percent); Reginald S.
Sheehan, Administrative Agencies and the Court: A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency
Type on Decisional Outcomes, 43 W. POL. Q. 875, 880 (1990) (reporting no significant overall difference in success rates for “economic” and “social” agencies, but finding significant
variation depending on the classification of “social” agencies’ decisions as “liberal” or “conservative”).
90 David H. Willison, supra note 25, at 321.
91 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994).
92 See James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice
of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 153 (1994).
93 Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 766.
94 Id. at 767. This validation rate is the same as the rate they previously observed for courts’
deference to agencies under Chevron. See Miles & Sunstein, Empirical Investigation, supra
note 25, at 825, 849 (analyzing 183 federal appellate cases reviewing EPA interpretations of
statutes and finding that judges deferred to the agency 64 percent of the time).
88

20 NEV. L.J. 733

752

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

Jason Czarnezki, analyzing ninety-three appellate cases decided between 2003
and 2005, found an affirmance rate of 69 percent for the EPA’s decisions.95
The dataset of EPA rules and cases reviewing them, from 1972 to the present,
constructed for this study was generally consistent with these prior findings,
showing an overall success rate of approximately 55 percent.96
Though Cary Coglianese and others have drilled down further and interpreted the available data as indicative of a judicial review process that is less
impactful than generally assumed,97 policymakers, and this work, remain rightly concerned about the roughly 40 percent of cases that result in rules being
remanded or invalidated.98 More specifically, EPA administrators would like
100 percent of the rules they finalize to survive judicial review unscathed, rather than have to deal with fixing, or completely reworking, a third of them.99
Remand or invalidation means extra work on the back end for the agency, and
if it could be avoided by including more support and/or information on the
front end, that would be a rational response.
B. Methodology
This analysis relied on a dataset based on 131 EPA rules from 1973 to
2017 that were subject to judicial review in one of the United States Courts of
Appeals or the United States Supreme Court. The data were extracted from the
rules themselves and the opinions reviewing them. That dataset was constructed by first identifying, via a search query in LexisNexis,100 United States
Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court cases wherein EPA rules were mentioned
alongside arbitrary and capricious review. Those search results were then individually screened to create the dataset of 131 cases that actually involved arbitrary and capricious review of the EPA rule(s) referenced in the opinion (as opposed to cases disposed of on other grounds, such as Chevron deference,101 or
cases involving rules from other administrative agencies). The opinions from
the culled list comprised the first half of the source data. From the list of cases
95

Czarnezki, supra note 25, at 769, 782–84.
Data is a result of a study conducted by author and on file with the author.
97 See Coglianese, Empirical Analysis, supra note 55, at 1129–30.
98 Johnson, supra note 79, at 773 (“When agencies’ rules are challenged in court, most empirical studies have found courts invalidate the rules in 30 [percent] [to] 40 [percent] of the
cases.”); id. at 768–69 (“commentators frequently reference . . . studies that have found
agency rules are invalidated in 30 [percent] [to] 50 [percent] of the cases in which they are
challenged.”). A simple average of the figures reported in the studies mentioned here yields a
reversal rate of 38 percent. See supra text accompanying notes 86–9688.
99 A simple average of the figures for review of EPA decisions discussed here yields a reversal rate of 32.5 percent. See supra text accompanying notes 91–96.
100 The specific query searched the LexisAdvance database of published Federal Courts of
Appeal and United States Supreme Court opinions for the following terms in combination:
“EPA” and “rule” and “arbitrary and capricious.” The search returned 1,529 opinions that
satisfied the parameters (search results on file with author).
101
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
96
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a list of the rules subject to review in those cases was produced. The Federal
Register entries for those rules comprised the second half of the source data.
The opinions included within the source data were then coded on a binary
dimension indicating that the EPA rule subjected to arbitrary and capricious review was either: (1) upheld or (2) reversed or remanded to the agency.102 That
binary coding comprised one half of the data necessary to perform a statistical
analysis. The page count for each of the Federal Register entries for the identified rules comprised the other half of the data necessary to test the insulations
hypothesis.
Statistical analysis was then performed using IBM SPSS Statistics software.103 Specifically, two partial correlation and two simple regression analyses104 were performed on the dataset and a subset of the dataset, as well as descriptive statistical analyses for both the complete dataset and the selected
subset. The partial correlation analyses performed produced the zero-order correlations (correlations without any control variables) between the year of the
final rule, the pages in that rule’s Federal Register entry, and whether that rule
was upheld on judicial review; the analyses also produced the partial correlation of the pages in that rule’s Federal Register entry with whether that rule was
upheld on judicial review (controlling for the year the rule was promulgated).105
The descriptive statistics revealed, among other things, the means, medians,
and standard deviations for Federal Register pages. The boxplots produced with
those descriptive statistics allowed for the identification, and subsequent removal, of outliers. After the outliers were removed from both the complete dataset and the selected subset, the partial correlation and regression analyses
were re-run, producing a second set of results for each.
C. Results
Table 1 provides the results testing for partial correlations on the entire dataset of EPA rules between the pages in a rule’s Federal Register entry, whether
that rule was upheld on judicial review, and the year of the final rule. The results show both zero-order correlations and correlations controlling for the year
of the final rule.
102

In the dataset, a code “2.0” indicated a rule being upheld, while a code “1.0” indicated a
rule being reversed or remanded.
103 IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 25.0 (2017).
104 Correlation analysis identifies the association (magnitude and direction) between two
variables, or the absence of a significant association. See Introduction to Correlation and Regression Analysis, BOSTON U. SCH. PUB. HEALTH, http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Mod
ules/BS/BS704_Multivariable/BS704_Multivariable5.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2020). Regression analysis generates a model meant to predict the value of one variable based on the
known value of the other. See Gallo, supra note 50.
105 Controlling for the year was necessary to ensure that the strong, positive linear relationship between year and rule length, observed in the larger dataset and reported supra, did not
influence the results in testing the insulation hypothesis.
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TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS
Control Variables

Number of
Pages in Final
Rule Fed.
Reg. Entry?

Reverse

Year (Final
Rule)

-None-a Number of Pages Correlation
in Final Rule Fed. Significance
Reg. Entry?
(2-tailed)
df

1.000

-.101

.258

.

.251

.003

0

129

129

Reverse/Remand Correlation

-.101

1.000

.101

Significance
(2-tailed)
df

.251

.

.249

129

0

129

Year (Final Rule) Correlation

.258

.101

1.000

Significance
(2-tailed)
df

.003

.249

.

129

129

0

Number of Pages Correlation
in Final Rule Fed. Significance
Reg. Entry?
(2-tailed)
df

1.000

-.132

.

.134

0

128

Reverse/Remand Correlation

-.132

1.000

Significance
(2-tailed)
df

.134

.

128

0

Year
(Final
Rule)

a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.

The zero-order correlation between the number of Federal Register pages a
rule comprises and its fate on judicial review is both very low (-0.101) and not
statistically significant (p = 0.251). Furthermore, the sign of the correlation
(negative) is the opposite of hypothesized; a significant negative correlation
would indicate that shorter rules enjoy more success when subjected to arbitrariness review. The partial correlation is only slightly different (-0.132) and,
though closer to significance, still falls short (p = 0.134). The slight change
from the zero-order correlation is due to the positive correlations between the
year and both the number of pages in a rule and a rule’s resilience to judicial
review.
Table 2 provides the summary results for a regression analysis, which
sought to determine whether the number of Federal Register pages was a good
predictor of whether a rule was upheld on judicial review.
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TABLE 2: MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.101a
.010
.003
.49881
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry?

The low R-square result (0.010) indicates that the regression model only
explains 1 percent of the variance in the data. Coupled with the lack of a statistically significant correlation, these initial findings suggest that no relationship
exists between the length of a rule and its fate on judicial review. Put simply,
this finding does not support the insulation hypothesis.
In order to determine whether the data were skewed by outliers (particularly lengthy rules that were overturned or particularly short rules that were upheld), it is useful to examine the descriptive statistics for the data set. Table 3
presents the mean and median number of pages for two groups of rules—those
that were reversed or remanded and those that were upheld. Figure 4 presents
box plots of these groups.
The simple descriptive results are revealing. Both the mean (63.5 pages
versus 52.0 pages) and the median (53.0 pages versus 44.5 pages) figures were
slightly higher for the group of reversed or remanded rules than the group of
upheld rules. That is consistent with the weak negative correlation reported
above and inconsistent with the insulation hypothesis. Figure 4 reveals a total
of seven outliers (five in the upheld group and two in the reversed or remanded
group).
TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVES
Reverse
Number of Pages Reversed
Mean
in Final Rule Fed. or Rema 95% Confidence InterReg. Entry?
nded
val for Mean

Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation
Upheld
Mean
95% Confidence Inter- Lower
val for Mean
Bound
Upper
Bound
5% Trimmed Mean
Median
Variance
Std. Deviation

Statistic Std. Error
63.51
7.318
48.86
78.16
58.24
53.00
3159.392
56.208
52.01
38.56
65.47
44.53
33.50
3278.577
57.259

6.748
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FIGURE 4

Table 4 presents the partial correlation results for the dataset with the seven
identified outliers removed.
TABLE 4: CORRELATIONS
Control Variables

Number of Reverse Year (Final
Pages in
Rule)
Final Rule
Fed. Reg.
Entry?
-None-a
Number of Pages in
Correlation
1.000
-.222
.257
Final Rule Fed. Reg. Significance (2.
.013
.004
Entry?
tailed)
df
0
122
122
Reverse/Remand
Correlation
-.222
1.000
.093
Significance (2.013
.
.305
tailed)
df
122
0
122
Year (Final Rule)
Correlation
.257
.093
1.000
Significance (2.004
.305
.
tailed)
df
122
122
0
Year (Final Number of Pages in
Correlation
1.000
-.255
Rule)
Final Rule Fed. Reg. Significance (2.
.004
Entry?
tailed)
df
0
121
Reverse/Remand
Correlation
-.255
1.000
Significance (2.004
.
tailed)
df
121
0
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
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With the outliers excluded, a different statistical picture emerges. The zeroorder correlation between the number of Federal Register pages a rule comprises and its fate on judicial review is now slightly more substantial (-0.222) and,
more importantly, statistically significant (p = 0.013). However, the sign of the
correlation (negative) remains the opposite of hypothesized, indicating that a
significant inverse relationship exists between the number of pages in a rule
and whether that rule survives judicial review. In other words, at least for the
rules in the dataset, shorter rules, rather than longer rules, were upheld more
often. The partial correlation shows the same directionality with a slightly
stronger (-0.255) and more statistically significant (p = 0.004) effect. The
change from the zero-order correlation can be explained by the removal of the
positive correlations between the year and both the number of pages in a rule
and a rule’s resilience to judicial review, which would tend to soften or counteract the observed negative correlation.
Table 5 provides the summary results for a regression analysis with the
outliers excluded. Again, the regression attempts to model whether the number
of Federal Register pages was a good predictor of whether a rule was upheld on
judicial review.
TABLE 5: MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.222a
.049
.041
.48991
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry?

Interestingly, despite the significant negative correlations reported above,
the regression model cannot explain a large percentage of the variance in the
data. Indeed, the R-squared result indicates that the model explains less than 5
percent of the variance. Taken together these results suggest that although
shorter rules tended to enjoy more success when reviewed by courts, the length
of a given rule is not a particularly accurate predictor of whether or not it will
survive judicial review. Logically, this result makes sense. A particularly accurate regression model based on a negative correlation would suggest that policymakers could better insulate their decisions from judicial review by explaining them less fully. Put another way: the statistically significant negative
correlation simply disproves the insulation hypothesis, while a strong Rsquared regression model would provide evidence for a directly opposite hypothesis.
Examining the dataset of 131 rules more closely, one finds that a substantial subset of them (31) are rules merely approving or disapproving of State
Implementation Plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act’s National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) program.106 There is reason to suspect that these
106

42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2018); Data on file with author.
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rules may be skewing the sample. Such SIP rules tend to be shorter: the mean
length of the thirty-one rules in the dataset that promulgated approvals (or disapprovals) of SIPs was twenty-four pages, whereas the mean length of the remaining one hundred rules in the dataset was sixty-seven pages.107 SIP rules
tend to be upheld by United States Courts of Appeal: of the thirty-one rules in
the dataset that promulgated approvals (or disapprovals) of SIPs, twenty-one
(67.7 percent) were upheld, whereas of the remaining one hundred rules, only
fifty-one (51.0 percent) were upheld.108
Table 6 presents the partial correlation results for the subset of rules not related to SIP approvals. Again, the correlations tested were between the pages in
a rule’s Federal Register entry, whether that rule was upheld on judicial review,
and the year of the final rule. Table 7 provides the summary results for a regression analysis, which sought to determine whether the number of Federal
Register pages was a good predictor of whether a rule was upheld on judicial
review.
TABLE 6: CORRELATIONS
Control Variables

-None-a

Number of Pages in Correlation
Final Rule Fed. Significance (2Reg. Entry?
tailed)
df
Reverse/Remand

Year (Final Rule)

Number of
ReYear (Final
Pages in verse/Rema Rule)
Final Rule
nd
Fed. Reg.
Entry?
1.000
-.070
.383
.

.486

.000

0

98

98

Correlation

-.070

1.000

.109

Significance (2tailed)
df

.486

.

.281

98

0

98

Correlation

.383

.109

1.000

Significance (2tailed)
df

.000

.281

.

98

98

0

Year (Final Number of Pages in Correlation
Rule)
Final Rule Fed. Significance (2Reg. Entry?
tailed)

1.000

-.122

.

.228

107

Data is a result of a study conducted by author and on file with author.
Comparing these affirmance rates with those reported by prior studies, see supra notes
85–98 and accompanying text, both figures are within the range of reported results. The 51.0
percent affirmance figure is more consistent with the average of all the studies (reversal rate
of 46 percent), whereas the 67.7 percent affirmance figure is very consistent with the average
of the EPA-specific studies (reversal rate of 32.5 percent).
108

20 NEV. L.J. 733

Spring 2020]

WORD LIMITED

Reverse/Remand

759

df

0

97

Correlation

-.122

1.000

Significance (2tailed)
df

.228

.

97

0

a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
TABLE 7: MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.070a
.005
-.005
.50372
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry?

Comparing the results for this subset of the data to the results for the entire
dataset reported above, there is little remarkable difference. As expected, (due
to the relatively higher rate of affirmance and short length of the SIP-related
rules removed to form the subset) the magnitude of the negative correlations
both for zero-order and partial correlations was diminished. Importantly for the
robustness of this study’s findings, the sign did not change, indicating that the
observed negative correlation was not simply a result of the SIP-related rulemakings skewing the data. The regression analysis also did not change significantly; in fact, with the SIP-related rulemakings removed, the R-squared result
actually marginally increased.
To complete a thorough analysis, the subset was also subjected to the same
descriptive statistics workup as the entire dataset above. Table 8 presents the
mean and median number of pages for two groups of rules within the subset–
those non-SIP-related rules that were reversed or remanded and those that were
upheld. Figure 5 presents box plots of these groups.
TABLE 8: DESCRIPTIVES
Reverse Remand
Number of Pages in Reversed or
Mean
Final Rule Fed. Remanded 95% Confidence
Reg. Entry?
Interval for Mean

Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
5% Trimmed Mean

Upheld

Statistic Std. Error
71.88

8.254

55.28
88.47
67.34

Median

75.00

Variance

3338.193

Std. Deviation

57.777

Mean

63.47

8.714
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45.97
80.97
56.19

Median

40.00

Variance

3872.414

Std. Deviation

62.229

FIGURE 5

Despite removing the SIP-related rules from both groups, the mean (71.9
pages versus 63.5 pages) and the median (75.0 pages versus 40.0 pages) figures
remained higher for the group of reversed or remanded rules than the group of
upheld rules. Again, that is consistent with the weak negative correlation reported above and inconsistent with the insulation hypothesis. Figure 5 reveals a
total of six outliers (four in the upheld group and two in the reversed or remanded group).
Table 9 presents the partial correlation results for the most refined subset of
the data tested (excluding SIP-related rules and excluding outliers within that
subset). Table 10 presents the regression analysis results for that same stylized
subset.
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TABLE 9: CORRELATIONS
Control Variables

-None-a

Number of Reverse/Remand Year
Pages in Final
(Final
Rule Fed. Reg.
Rule)
Entry?

Number of Pages in Correlation
Final Rule Fed. Significance
Reg. Entry?
(2-tailed)
df

1.000

-.183

.405

.

.078

.000

0

92

92

Correlation

-.183

1.000

.098

Significance
(2-tailed)
df

.078

.

.347

92

0

92

Correlation

.405

.098

1.000

Significance
(2-tailed)
df

.000

.347

.

92

92

0

Year (Final Number of Pages in Correlation
Rule)
Final Rule Fed. Significance
Reg. Entry?
(2-tailed)
df

1.000

-.244

.

.018

0

91

Reverse/Remand

Correlation

-.244

1.000

Significance
(2-tailed)
df

.018

.

91

0

Reverse/Remand

Year (Final Rule)

a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
TABLE 10: MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.183a
.033
.023
.49690
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Pages in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry?

Unlike the results for the complete dataset, the negative zero-order correlation did not become significant when the outliers were removed. However, a
significant and stronger negative partial correlation (-0.244, p = 0.018) again
emerged once the positive correlation with the year was controlled for. The duplication of this significant result in the subset of data that excludes the potentially abnormal SIP-related rules adds support to the findings from the complete
dataset, which invalidated the insulation hypothesis. The regression analysis on
the subset with outliers excluded also produced similar results to the regression
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analysis on the complete dataset with outliers excluded. The regression model
still cannot explain a large percentage of the variance in the data in the subset.
Here, the R-squared result indicates that the model explains less than 4 percent
of the variance.
Overall, the results of these analyses taken together disprove the insulation
hypothesis. Among the rules in the dataset, and among the rules in the tested
subset, the length of a rule was not positively related to its treatment by the
courts on judicial review. Indeed, once the outliers were removed, a significant
negative relationship emerged. However, that negative relationship could not
form the basis of a useful predictive model. One ultimately must conclude that
no useful relationship exists between a rule’s length and whether a court decides to reverse or remand it when subjecting it to arbitrary and capricious review. Thus, an administrator directing his or her staff to write more in every
rule cannot rationally justify that deployment of resources on the basis of
threatened judicial review.
In 2010, David Zaring helpfully aggregated and compared many of the
above-referenced prior studies of judicial review.109 His literature review provides important context for this study’s results. Zaring’s graphical presentation
of the observed rates of success on judicial review over time suggests the lack
of a significant relationship between the year of judicial review and the outcome of that review.110 Because of the strong positive correlation between
years and pages, if the insulation hypothesis held true, one would expect to see
the observed judicial review success rate increase over time. Zaring’s analysis
does not show such a trend and thus provides some additional evidence against
the insulation hypothesis and consistent with the results here.
D. Anecdotal Examples
Behind the empirical results lie some interesting and illuminating comparisons of individual cases dealing with rules pertaining to similar subjects. Two
rules concerning gasoline additives provide a simple illustration that anecdotally supports the empirical findings and cuts against the hypothesis that the increased length of environmental regulations is a necessary reaction to more
searching judicial inquiry, rather than a product of overzealous risk aversion. In
1973, the EPA finalized a “Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives” that was
the first control of lead added to gasoline.111 The Federal Register entry for the
final rule was eight pages.112 The rule was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA.113 Twenty-five years later, the EPA promulgated another “Regu109

David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010).
Id. at 172.
111 Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed.
Reg. 33,734 (Dec. 6, 1973).
112 Id. at 33,734–41.
113
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 12 n.15, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
110
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lation of Fuels and Fuel Additives” that was subject to judicial review.114 The
Federal Register entry for that rule, setting baseline requirements for foreignproduced gasoline, was thirty-six pages (more than four times longer).115 That
rule was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA.116 The
fact that the latter rule was significantly longer could not have been a response
to the review of the earlier rule. Both rules successfully survived judicial review, despite the disparity in length.
A set of cases dealing with Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
regulations under the Clean Air Act’s NAAQS program117 tell a similar story.
The first set of PSD rules,118 promulgated in 1974 and 1975, were challenged in
Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency.119 The D.C. Circuit “[found]
no ground on which to disturb the regulations under review, and . . . therefore
affirm[ed] the EPA ‘Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration’ regulations.”120 The regulations totaled nineteen pages.121
The EPA updated and expanded upon those PSD regulations multiple times
over the years since their initial promulgation, including in 2002.122 Those regulations totaled 105 Federal Register pages, more than five times the length of
the 1970s PSD rules.123 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit found that “two aspects
of the 2002 rule rest[ed] on impermissible interpretations of the Act and a third
[was] arbitrary and capricious.”124 The arbitrary and capricious component of
the rule exempted sources undergoing changes from recordkeeping requirements if those sources themselves determined that the changes could not reasonably qualify as “modifications” for permitting purposes.125 The court found
that the EPA had failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its inclusion of
114

Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements for Gasoline Produced
by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533 (Aug. 28, 1997).
115 Id. at 45,533–68.
116 George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
117 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1977).
118 Final PSD regulations were published December 5, 1974, (Approval and Promulgation
of Implementation Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 39 Fed. Reg.
42,510 (Dec. 5, 1974)), and were amended slightly on January 16, 1975 (Approval and
Promulgation of Implementation Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration;
Correction, 40 Fed. Reg. 2,802 (Jan. 16, 1975)), June 12, 1975 (Approval and Promulgation
of Implementation Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 40 Fed. Reg.
25,004 (June 12, 1975)), and Sept. 10, 1975 (Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans: Prevention of Significant Air Quality Deterioration, 40 Fed. Reg. 42,011 (Sept. 10,
1975)).
119 Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1119–20 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
120 Id. at 1140.
121 See Final PSD Regulations, supra note 119.
122 Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review
(NSR), 67 Fed. Reg. 80,189–90 (Dec. 31, 2002).
123 Compare id., with PSD Regulations, supra note 118.
124 New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
125
Id. at 11.
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the aforementioned exemption, despite publishing a rule of more than 100 Federal Register pages.126
These stories reflect just two pairs of rules and cases that exemplify the
empirical results. It is likely that others tell supporting (and conflicting) stories;
however, when aggregated, the cases in the sample demonstrate a significant
negative correlation that disproves the insulation hypothesis. The anecdotal evidence adds some weight to that conclusion, but, more importantly, it presents a
picture of how and why the number of pages in a final rule is not a good predictor of that rule’s fate when subjected to arbitrariness review.
V. THE SOCIALLY BENEFICIAL HYPOTHESIS
A. Introduction
The second potential correlation this piece will investigate is the relationship between the number of words in a rule and the quantified net benefits of
that rule. At least since President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291 in
1981,127 agencies have been required to provide cost-benefit analyses for “major rules” to the Office of Management and Budget.128 Scholars have long
pointed to this command itself as a cause of the purported ossification of rulemaking activity.129 No study as of yet has examined whether the content of
those cost-benefit analyses reveals anything about the pattern of rulemaking in
126

Id. (“The agency failed to provide a reasoned explanation for how, absent such records, it
can ensure compliance with NSR.”).
127 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). President Clinton issued
Executive Order No. 12,866 in 1993, reaffirming and further clarifying this requirement. See
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
128 Defined as:
any regulation that is likely to result in: (1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more; (2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State,
or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or (3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United Statesbased enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193. (Feb. 17, 1981). President Clinton’s Executive
Order No.12,866 applied the cost-benefit analysis requirement to “significant regulatory action,” a category which, though very similar, also included any rule that may “[r]aise novel
legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order.” See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735
(Sept. 30, 1993).
129 See, e.g., Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 32, at 88 (“When President
Reagan first established formal White House review of rulemaking under E.O. 12,291, critics raised separation of powers questions, but they also complained that OMB review would
impede agencies’ ability to make new regulations.”); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference
with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059,
1064 (1986) (“OMB control imposes costly delays that are paid for through the decreased
health and safety of the American public.”); Pierce, supra note 86, at 62 (“The executive
branch has contributed to ossification through the direct and indirect effects of the Office of
Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) methods of implementing Executive Order 12,291.”).
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this country. The empirical analysis herein presents an effort to at least begin to
fill that gap.
Independent of the relationship between a rule’s projected benefits (or
costs) and its length, some empirical evaluation of the reported costs of rules
over time has been conducted. One study examined annual compliance costs
associated with environmental regulations from 1972 to 1990 and reported that
they have grown steadily on an absolute basis and as a percentage of gross national product.130 Cary Coglianese has also written of the existence of a similar
trend based on reports from the Office of Management and Budget.131 These
studies essentially contend that regulations have become increasingly costly to
regulated parties and to society. However, the costs of regulations only reflect
one-half of the relevant cost-benefit equation. The analyses below rely on net
cost-benefit figures reported by the EPA to determine whether there is a statistically significant relationship between those figures and the length of rules.
The results of this analysis could prove useful in assessing the costeffectiveness of the modern administrative state, using the number of words in
a Federal Register entry as a proxy for the amount of work federal government
employees devoted to crafting the associated rule. If regulations that have required more work have also produced more net benefits, there should be no
cause for concern.
B. Methodology
This analysis relied on a dataset comprised of information pertaining to
rules for which numerical cost-benefit analyses were readily available. That dataset was constructed by first finding a publicly available repository of Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) produced by the EPA since 1981.132 That repository included RIAs for fifty-one final rules promulgated pursuant to the Clean
Air Act; of those fifty-one RIAs, forty included numerical cost-benefit analyses
and thus formed the basis of the dataset.133 That subset of RIAs provided the
first half of the source data. From the RIAs themselves a list of the rules they
analyzed was produced. The Federal Register entries for those rules comprised
the second half of the source data.
Cost, benefit, and net figures for each regulation were then drawn from the
RIAs included within the source data. Because the EPA often included a range
of estimates in each RIA for costs and benefits (tying different estimates to dif130

Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 132, 140 (1995).
131 Coglianese, Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 32, at 91 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, DRAFT 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS 34 (2007)).
132 Regulatory Impact Analyses for Air Pollution Regulations, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
economic-and-cost-analysis-air-pollution-regulations/regulatory-impact-analyses-air-poll
ution [https://perma.cc/YQ54-W7Q4] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020).
133
Data is a result of a study conducted by the author and on file with the author.
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ferent scenarios), the data collected was limited to the highest and lowest absolute values for each parameter—costs, benefits, and net.134 These figures comprised one-half of the data necessary to perform the statistical analyses. The
Federal Register entries for the identified rules yielded page counts, and freely
available word-counting software was used to produce a word count for each of
the Federal Register entries. The resulting page and word count figures comprised the other half of the source data. The high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) for each rule was divided by the number of words in that rule to
produce high and low estimates of benefits (or costs) per word for each rulemaking.
Finally, statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics software.135 Again, the first test performed was a partial correlation, producing the
zero-order correlations (correlations without any control variables) between the
year of the final rule, the highest net benefit (or cost) estimate for that rule, the
lowest net benefit (or cost) estimate for that rule, and the number of words in
that rule’s Federal Register entry; the analyses also produced the partial correlation of the words in that rule’s Federal Register entry with the high and low
estimates of net benefits (or costs) (controlling for the year the rule was promulgated).136 A regression analysis was performed to determine whether the
number of words in a Federal Register entry was a significant predictor of the
high estimate of a rule’s net benefits. From the scatterplot associated with that
regression analysis, one outlier was identified and removed. The partial correlation and regression analyses were then re-run with the identified outlier excluded. In addition, a regression analysis was performed to verify that the year a
rule was published was not a significant predictor of the high or low net benefits (or costs) per word of that rule. This last test was meant to demonstrate empirically the trend, or more precisely lack thereof, in benefits-per-word over
time.
C. Empirical Findings
Table 11 provides the results testing for partial correlations on the dataset
of EPA CAA rules between the number of words in a rule’s Federal Register
entry, the highest net benefit (or cost) estimate, the lowest net benefit (or cost)

134

Often the only, or most significant, factor affecting these values was the discount rate.
The methodology employed treated different discount rates like any other scenario. This
piece takes no position on the appropriate discount rate to be applied for cost-benefit analyses or even if one should be applied at all. For a thoughtful discussion of the difficulties
posed by discounting in environmental law, see generally Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting
. . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007).
135 IBM SPSS Statistics, Version 25.0 (2017).
136 Controlling for the year was necessary to ensure that the strong, positive linear relationship between year and rule length, observed in the larger dataset and reported supra, did not
influence the results in testing the insulation hypothesis.
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estimate, and the year of the final rule. The results show both zero-order correlations and correlations controlling for the year of the final rule.
TABLE 11: CORRELATIONS
Control Variables

-None-a

Number of
Words in
Final Rule
Fed. Reg.
Entry?

Number of
Correlation
Words in Final Significance
Rule Fed. Reg. (2-tailed)
Entry?
df

1.000

Highest Lowest Net
Net (Cost (Cost or
or Benefit) Benefit)
Projection Projection
(millions (millions
$)
$)
.520
.545

Year
(final
rule)

.199

.

.001

.000

.218

0

38

38

38

Highest Net
Correlation
(Cost or Benefit) Significance
Projection (mil- (2-tailed)
lions $)
df

.520

1.000

.923

.034

.001

.

.000

.836

38

0

38

38

Lowest Net (Cost Correlation
or Benefit) Pro- Significance
jection (millions (2-tailed)
$)
df

.545

.923

1.000

.151

.000

.000

.

.353

38

38

0

38

Year (final rule) Correlation

.199

.034

.151

1.000

Significance
(2-tailed)
df

.218

.836

.353

.

38

38

38

0

Year (final
Number of
Correlation
rule)
Words in Final Significance
Rule Fed. Reg. (2-tailed)
Entry?
df

1.000

.524

.531

.

.001

.001

0

37

37

Highest Net
Correlation
(Cost or Benefit) Significance
Projection (mil- (2-tailed)
lions $)
df

.524

1.000

.929

.001

.

.000

37

0

37

Lowest Net (Cost Correlation
or Benefit) Pro- Significance
jection (millions (2-tailed)
$)
df

.531

.929

1.000

.001

.000

.

37

37

0

a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.

The zero-order correlations between the number of words in the Federal
Register entry and both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) re-

20 NEV. L.J. 733

768

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:2

port as modestly positive (0.520 and 0.545, respectively) and very significant (p
= 0.001, p < 0.001). Because, within this dataset (as in the larger dataset examined supra), the correlation between a rule’s length and the year of its promulgation was positive, the partial correlations controlling for year provide the
more useful picture. Very little change is observed when year is controlled for.
The partial correlations between the number of words in the Federal Register
entry and both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) remain
modestly positive (0.524 and 0.531) and very significant (p = 0.001, p = 0.001).
Figure 6 provides a scatterplot and summary results for a regression analysis, which sought to determine whether the number of words in a Federal Register entry was a good predictor of the net social impact of that rule (measured
by the high estimate of net benefits (or costs)).
Figure 6

The regression results indicate that the variation in the number of words in
MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.520a
.270
.251
$42,713.70139
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Words in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry?

Federal Registry entries can at least in part be explained by the estimated social
impacts of rules. More precisely, the R-square value (0.27) suggests that the
regression model can explain about a quarter of the variation (27 percent) in the
data. This suggests that the length of a rule can accurately predict the magnitude of the high estimate of that rule’s net benefits (or costs) for approximately
one out of four rules. The relative inaccuracy of the model likely precludes any
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practical application of it. In other words, policymakers, or stakeholders, should
not rely on the length of a rule, by itself, to inform them of the likely net social
benefits of that rule; independent cost-benefit analyses remain worthwhile and
important endeavors. The hypothesis of interest to this study, however, concerns not the continued utility of cost-benefit analyses, but the relative utility of
lengthier, versus shorter, rules. The positive correlations between words and net
benefits reported above confirm the socially beneficial hypothesis with respect
to rules in the sample from the last four decades of EPA activity.
In addition to displaying the graphical representation of the regression
equation, the scatterplot, perhaps more importantly, reveals the presence of one
prominent outlier—the Transport Rule.137 To present a fuller account of the story that the data tells, and to ensure that the unusually beneficial (at least according to EPA’s estimates) Transport Rule was not skewing the sample, the correlation and regression analyses were performed on the dataset without that
outlier. Table 12 provides the partial correlation results for the dataset of EPA
CAA rules (minus the Transport Rule). The results show both zero-order correlations and correlations controlling for the year of the final rule.
TABLE 12: CORRELATIONS
Control Variables

-None-a

Year (final

137

Number of
Words in Final
Rule Fed. Reg.
Entry?
Highest Net
(Cost or Benefit)
Projection (millions $)
Lowest Net (Cost
or Benefit) Projection (millions
$)
Year (final rule)

Number of

Number of Highest Net Lowest Net
Words in
(Cost or
(Cost or
Final Rule Benefit)
Benefit)
Fed. Reg. Projection Projection
Entry? (millions $) (millions
$)
Correlation
1.000
.455
.520
Significance
.
.004
.001
(2-tailed)
df
0
37
37
Correlation
.455
1.000
.715
Significance
.004
.
.000
(2-tailed)
df
37
0
37
Correlation
.520
.715
1.000
Significance
.001
.000
.
(2-tailed)
df
37
37
0
Correlation
.184
-.059
.169
Significance
.261
.723
.303
(2-tailed)
df
37
37
37
Correlation
1.000
.474
.505

Year
(final
rule)

.184
.261
37
-.059
.723
37
.169
.303
37
1.000
.
0

Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011).
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Significance
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Significance
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.

.003

.001

0
.474
.003

36
1.000
.

36
.736
.000

36
.505
.001

0
.736
.000

36
1.000
.

36

36

0

The zero-order correlations between the number of words in the Federal
Register entry and both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs)
remain modestly positive (0.455 and 0.520, respectively) and significant (p =
0.004, p = 0.001). Both the magnitude and statistical significance of the correlations saw a very small decrease from the analysis on the entire dataset. Again,
controlling for the year of a given rule had little effect on the results, with partial correlations between the number of words in the Federal Register entry and
both the high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) reporting as modestly
positive (0.474 and 0.520) and significant (p = 0.003, p = 0.001). The removal
of the identified outlier thus has little effect on the conclusions policymakers
and scholars can draw from this analysis; the Transport Rule did not cause the
observed positive correlations.
Figure 7 provides a scatterplot and summary results for a regression analysis, which sought to determine whether the number of words in a Federal Register entry was a better predictor of the net social impact of that rule (measured
by the high estimate of net benefits (or costs)) with the extreme outlier excluded.
FIGURE 7
MODEL SUMMARY
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Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate
1
.455a
.207
.185
$23,950.94816
a. Predictors: (Constant), Number of Words in Final Rule Fed. Reg. Entry?

Interestingly, the regression model constructed on the narrower dataset performed worse than the regression model based on the complete dataset. The Rsquared value suggests that, rather than explaining a quarter of the variance,
this model now explains only about one-fifth (21 percent). Again, this result
indicates that the number of words in a Federal Register entry alone does not
provide a reliable predictor of the amount of net benefits a rule projects to impart upon society. The underwhelming regression models, however, do not disprove the hypothesis or the correlation findings. Looking at the partial correlations and regression analyses together, one can discern that over the same
period that rules have gotten longer138 those rules have each also tended to provide more net benefits to society, but the positive correlation between those two
variables does not translate into a predictive model that indicates precisely how
much net benefit one can expect to gain by writing a longer rule. The socially
beneficial hypothesis posited simply that a statistically significant positive correlation exists, and the data confirm that.
One alternative way to formulate the socially beneficial hypothesis frames
it in terms of net benefits (or costs) per word in a Federal Register entry. This
formulation posits that over time the estimated net benefits per word of EPA
regulations has been stable; there exists no statistically significant trend in benefits per word over time. Table 13 shows the correlation results testing for a relationship between both high and low estimates of net benefits (or costs) per
word and the year. Figures 8 and 9 provide scatterplots and regression analyses
examining that same potential relationship. Figure 8 uses the high net benefits
(or costs) estimates to calculate the benefits per word data; Figure 9 uses the
low net benefits (or costs) estimates.
TABLE 13: CORRELATIONS
Year (final High Net Benefit Low Net Benefit
rule)
per Word
per Word
Year (final rule)
Pearson Correla1
-.040
.182
tion
Sig. (2-tailed)
.806
.261
N
40
40
40
High Net Benefit per Pearson Correla- -.040
1
.745**
Word
tion
Sig. (2-tailed)
.806
.000
N
40
40
40
138

See supra Part II.
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Low Net Benefit per Pearson Correla.182
Word
tion
Sig. (2-tailed)
.261
N
40
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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.745**

1

.000
40

40

FIGURE 8

MODEL SUMMARY
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R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

1

.040a

.002

-.025

a. Predictors: (Constant), Year (final rule)
FIGURE 9

Std. Error of the
Estimate
$247,344.28837
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MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

1

.182a

.033

.008

Std. Error of the
Estimate
$81,623.71590

a. Predictors: (Constant), Year (final rule)

The correlation results are telling. The magnitude of any observed correlation was slight (-0.040 and 0.182) and inconsistent in direction between the two
estimates of benefits (or costs) per word. Most importantly, neither correlation
measured as close to statistically significant (p = 0.806 and p = 0.261). As one
would expect given this lack of significant correlation, both scatterplots show
variation in the data, but no pattern related to the passage of time emerges. The
regression models confirm that the year of rulemaking proved a very poor predictor of net benefits per word. Indeed, the R-square value for the high estimates of benefits per word (0.002) suggests that the model cannot even explain
1 percent of the variation in the data. The regression model based on the low
estimates did not fare much better, explaining about 3 percent of the variation
in the data (0.033). Alone these regression analyses do not confirm (or refute)
the socially beneficial hypothesis. However, they provide an additional level of
robustness to the confirmation of the hypothesis reported above.
D. Anecdotal Examples
Two rules pertaining to regional haze provide some anecdotal support for
the hypothesis that regulations are longer in part because they have a larger
marginal impact and produce more benefits. The Federal Register entry for the
Regional Haze Rule,139 promulgated by the EPA in 1999, comprised 69,647
words. According to the EPA, the rule would produce net benefits of up to $3
billion, which would equate to a net benefit of $43,074 per word (the low-end
estimate was a net cost of $1 billion, equating to a net cost of $14,358 per
word).140 In 2005, the EPA promulgated regulations updating the Regional
Haze Rule, particularly focused on Best Available Retrofit Technology
(BART) Determinations.141 The Federal Register entry included 84,252
words.142 According to the EPA, the rule would produce net benefits of up to
$12.0 billion, which would equate to a net benefit of $142,430 per word (the
low end estimate was net benefits of $1.9 billion, equating to a net benefit of
139

Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714 (July 1, 1999).
See INNOV. STRATS. & ECON. GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE 6 (1999), available at https://www3.epa.gov/
ttn/ecas/docs/ria/visibility-rule_ria_final-reg-haze-rule_1999-04.pdf [hereinafter REGULATO
RY IMPACT ANALYSIS FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE].
141 Regional Haze Regulations and Guidelines for Best Available Retrofit Technology
(BART) Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,104 (July 6, 2005).
142
Data is a result of a study conducted by author and on file with author.
140
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$22,551 per word).143 Though close in time, these Regional-Haze Rules actually show an increase in net benefit per word over time.
A series of rules setting the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
ozone tell a similar tale. In 1997, the EPA updated the Ozone NAAQS in a
Federal Register entry totaling 50,210 words.144 The EPA estimated that net
benefits from that rule would accrue in an amount between $700 million and $1
billion, which equates to a net benefit per word figure between $13,941 and
$19,916.145 Eleven years later, in 2008, the EPA again updated the Ozone
NAAQS.146 This time the Federal Register entry comprised 97,003 words and
the projected net benefits ranged from $7 to $11 billion.147 Thus, the net benefit
per word ranged from $72,163 to $113,399, an increase of more than five times
the prior rule. The most recent update to the Ozone NAAQS came in 2015.148
The Federal Register entry for that rule was the longest of the three by far, totaling 214,558 words. The estimated net benefits of the rule ranged from $1.5
to $4.5 billion, producing a benefit per word range of $6,991 to $20,973.149
Comparing these figures over time shows a spike in benefits per word with the
2008 rule and a return close to 1997 levels with the (much longer) 2015 rule.
Looking at the total benefits of each rule, rather than the per-word figures, one
observes an example of the positive correlation between length and estimated
social benefits. The inability to precisely model that relationship also emerges,
particularly when comparing the 2008 and 2015 rules.
These groups of similar rules exemplify the empirical results confirming
the socially beneficial hypothesis. Perhaps on an intuitive level, these results
will surprise few—longer, bigger, more complicated rules have more reach,
more impact, and more quantifiable benefit to society. However, if that relationship were pervasively self-evident, many of the criticisms of the regulatory
state mentioned at the outset would have fallen flat, or perhaps died out. Instead, they seem to be gaining, rather than losing, traction. The results reported
here confirm empirically, that, at least with respect to the EPA’s CAA rulemak143

See REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FINAL REGIONAL HAZE RULE, supra note 140, at 6.
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997).
145 See INNOV. STRATS. & ECON. GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSES FOR THE PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZE RULE 65–66
(1997), available at https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/docs/ria/naaqs-o3-pm_ria_proposal_19
97-07.pdf.
146 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16,436 (Mar. 27,
2008).
147 See generally AIR BENEFIT & COST GRP., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL OZONE NAAQS
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2008), available at https://www3.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata
/RIAs/452_R_08_003.pdf.
148 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,292 (Oct. 26, 2015).
149 See generally OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL REVISIONS TO THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR GROUND-LEVEL OZONE 15 (2015), available at https://www3.epa.
gov/ttnecas1/docs/20151001ria.pdf.
144
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ing, longer rules have provided more social benefits, and no significant change
in benefits per word over time exists. From this empirical conclusion emerges
the practical bottom line—policymakers at the EPA have rationally deployed
resources to write longer rules when those rules provide more benefits. Furthermore, the EPA’s rules have provided benefits to society on a relatively unchanging per-word basis.
VI. OTHER POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS
Many potential explanations exist for the observable trend in the length of
individual rules published in the Federal Register over time—some rational,
some irrational, some intuitive, others likely not. The empirical analyses above
test only two of those multitude. Specifically, this work tests two hypotheses
that would offer rational explanations for the trend towards longer rules. Although the data supported one of those two hypotheses, that does not preclude
the importance of other factors that this study was not designed to test. In fact,
the regression analysis results suggest that the addition of other variables may
yield a more accurate, and thus useful, predictive model. A fuller exploration of
some untargeted hypotheses helps to contextualize and better understand the
significance of the findings here.
Thoughtful perusal of the history of the United States since the rise of the
regulatory state in the 1970s yields a variety of possible drivers of increasing
rule length. In the realm of technology, it would be difficult to understate the
drastic changes to the way humans live, work, and relate with one another
brought on by the rise of the personal computer in the 1980s and the internet in
the 1990s. That technology certainly changed the capabilities of government
agencies with respect to rule writing and record building. Outside of the agencies themselves, the regulated community, and citizenry in general, gained access to vastly more information and the capacity to author and quickly submit
public comments based on that information.150 That latter reality intersects with
one of the first intuitions of administrative scholars when told of the trend at the
heart of this work; a good number of them would argue that the real driver of
the increased length of regulations is external to the rulemaking agency—the
number and complexity of public comments.151 Another common reaction
points to politics, insinuating that perhaps one political party (chiefly, the
150

See Thomas A. Bryer, Public Participation in Regulatory Decision-Making: Cases from
Regulations.gov, 37 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 263, 263 (2013) (describing regulations.gov as “an award-winning government Web site that has democratized the federal
rulemaking process by making it easier for citizens to search, read, and comment on proposed rules.”).
151 See, e.g., Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 121 (using the number of public comments as a proxy for the political interest in a rulemaking); Yackee & Yackee, supra note 31,
at 1459 (attributing an observed increase in the number of words in National Park Service
final rules at least in part to the requirement that agencies respond to public comments and
noting that “[e]arly final rules provided almost comically brief responses to public comments.”).
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Democratic party) caused the increase in regulatory complexity based on that
party’s view regarding the role of the federal government.152
Unfortunately, the scope of the data collection for this work, and its analysis, did not encompass the number of public comments the EPA received on the
rules comprising the two datasets. A future study focusing on just that type of
data for a wider sample of administrative rules would provide a welcome addition to the findings here.153 Until then, however, prior empirical research fortunately sheds little light on the question. The Kerwin and Furlong study discussed at the outset somewhat undercuts the hypothesis that the number of
comments drive the increasing length of rules. Kerwin and Furlong found that
there was a comparatively strong negative correlation between the number of
public comments received and the time it took to write a rule.154 Coupled with
their finding of no significant relationship between length of rule text and duration of rulemaking process,155 these findings do not suggest the existence of a
significant positive relationship between public comments received and rule
length. Without specifically testing for that correlation, they tend to undercut
the hypothesis that rules are longer simply due to an increase in public comments. However, Kerwin and Furlong’s study was limited in scope and conducted before the rise in personal computers, the advent of the internet, and the
launch of regulations.gov156—all significant developments for the public comment process. A future study using updated data to test the hypothesis that a
rise in public comments explains the increase in the length of regulations would
help clarify the picture.
Commentators, scholarly and otherwise, tend to focus on partisan politics
as an explanation for observed phenomena in regulatory activity.157 Cass Sunstein and Thomas Miles investigated arbitrary and capricious review through

152

See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 48, at 919 (testing, among others, the hypothesis that
“agencies engage in less rulemaking activity under Republican Presidents than Democratic
Presidents.”); see also Pugsley, supra note 12, at 477 (“Republicans now largely accept, as
an article of faith, that the EPA is overregulating and thereby hurting the economy.”).
153 Indeed, the author intends to design and conduct such a study.
154 Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14, at 131.
155 See id.
156 See Kerwin & Furlong, supra note 14.
157 See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 813–14 (testing whether the
political party of the President who appointed a judge was a statistically significant predictor
of that judge’s vote when reviewing agency activity); Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 197 (1982) (testing for variation in the regulatory activity of the NLRB, FTC, and SEC dependent on the President’s
Party); O’Connell, supra note 48, at 957, 957 n.177 (empirically examining the trend of
“Midnight Regulations” and finding no significant difference in that trend based on the political party in power); Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase
Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 1 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper, 2001) (empirical analysis of Federal Register pages added in post-election quarters, finding no statistically significant relationship between the President’s party and the number of pages added per
month).
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this lens.158 Sunstein and Miles empirically tested whether the party of the president that appointed a judge made a statistically significant difference in the
voting record of that judge when reviewing administrative rules.159 Their study
classified agency actions as “liberal” or “conservative” and found that Democratic appointees were significantly more likely to vote to uphold liberal agency
decisions and Republican appointees were significantly more likely to uphold
conservative agency decisions.160 On the whole they found that Democratic appointees had a 69 percent rate of liberal voting versus a 55 percent rate for Republican appointees.161 From these findings, Sunstein and Miles concluded that
“the political party of the appointing president is a fairly good predictor of how
a judge will vote in cases involving arbitrariness review.”162 Sunstein and
Miles’s results provide an explanation for the variation in judicial review outcomes, variation this study could not explain using the length of regulations as
a potential indicator. No study as of yet, however, has set out to answer the
question whether Democratic or Republican administrations tend to author significantly longer rules, and, more interestingly, whether the influence of one
political party could be responsible for the trend of increasing length over time.
Because the party in power, at least with respect to the executive branch, is
a relatively straightforward and publicly available data point, testing for a statistically significant relationship within the high-level data from the Office of
the Federal Register proved relatively simple. Consistent with the prevailing
perception of the Democratic party as relatively more pro-regulation than the
Republican party,163 a year in which the president was a Democrat was coded
2.00 and a year in which the president was a Republican was coded 1.00. Thus,
if the increase in Federal Register pages per rule could be attributed primarily
to Democrats, one would expect to see a positive correlation between the political party variable and the pages per rule variable. Table 14 provides the results
158

Miles & Sunstein, Real World, supra note 25, at 813.
Id. at 813–14.
160 Id. at 813. The effect intensified when sitting on a panel with all like-minded judges.
“Democratic appointees show especially liberal voting patterns when sitting on allDemocratic panels; Republican appointees show especially conservative voting patterns
when sitting on all-Republican panels.” Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 813–14 (noting that “the political party of the president who appointed the two other judges on the panel is also a strong predictor.”).
163 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,
83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717–18 (1997) (“Some commentators have criticized the D.C. Circuit’s politicization and have maintained that judges simply vote according to their policy
preferences. In environmental cases, the allegation goes, judges appointed by Republican
Presidents vote principally for laxer regulation and judges appointed by Democratic Presidents vote for more stringent regulation.”); Russell Heimlich, Deepening Divide Between
Republicans and Democrats Over Business Regulation, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 14, 2012),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2012/08/14/deepening-divide-between-republicansand-democrats-over-business-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/6ML6-EYRF] (finding that “76
[percent] of Republicans [versus only 41 percent of Democrats] say that government regulation of business does more harm than good”).
159
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for correlation analyses for these variables, reporting both zero-order and partial correlations controlling for year.
TABLE 14: CORRELATIONS
Control Variables
-none-a

Political Party
R/D

Political Party
R/D
1.000
.

Pages per
Rule
.295
.031

Year

0
.295
.031

39
1.000
.

39
.958
.000

39
.272
.043

0
.958
.000

39
1.000
.

39
1.000
.

39
.123
.226

0

0
.123
.226

38
1.000
.

38

0

Correlation
Significance (1tailed)
df
Pages per Rule
Correlation
Significance (1tailed)
df
Year
Correlation
Significance (1tailed)
df
Year
Political Party
Correlation
R/D
Significance (1tailed)
df
Pages per Rule
Correlation
Significance (1tailed)
df
a. Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.

.272
.043

It would appear from the zero-order correlations that indeed the political
party of the president had a statistically significant (p = 0.031) positive correlation (0.295) with the number of pages in the rules administrative agencies
promulgated during his tenure. However, the partial correlation results controlling for year reveal that positive correlation to be weaker (0.123) and no longer
significant (p = 0.226). These preliminary results are by no means conclusive
on the larger empirical question about the effect of political party on rule
length. Nonetheless, they suggest that the trend that this study attempts to explain by the insulation and socially beneficial hypotheses cannot easily be explained by politics instead.
Among the myriad of explanations for individual rules getting longer,
some of the more plausible may prove both difficult to test and relatively uninteresting in terms of implications for policymakers and commentators. Chiefly
the rise of the personal computer as a tool for agency work and the internet as a
method of commenting fit this description. Some data exist on the number of
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personal computers available to agency employees over time,164 but, unsurprisingly, those figures almost perfectly positively correlate with time (i.e., the
government has more computing power every year).165 Similarly, the invention,
and now reach, of the internet and access to it positively correlates with time
(i.e., internet access and speed improve each year).166 As a consequence, it was
outside the scope of this study to construct an empirical analysis that could isolate the effects of these technological advances on the length of regulations. A
more detailed data compilation and analysis focused on these advances, perhaps using more nuanced measures, would provide welcome insight. From a
logical, rather than empirical, perspective it is difficult to imagine that neither
the ease of word processing on a personal computer nor the widespread availability of information on the internet have any effect on the length and complexity of rulemaking.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
The twin empirical analyses of this piece asked, and began to answer, important questions about the effectiveness of the administrative state in relation
to the length of Federal Register entries. Policymakers, pundits, and the public
need to understand if the criticisms of the regulatory state embodied by the media photos of large stacks of paper have practical significance or merely represent misguided finger-pointing. The results reported above suggest the latter, at
least with respect to one of the two hypotheses tested.
Empirical analysis of the data collected from EPA CAA rules confirmed
the central claim of the socially beneficial hypothesis—longer rules have tended to confer more net benefits upon society. For policymakers, that finding
counsels an approach that estimates the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation early on in the process and then devotes resources (and Federal Register
pages) to those rules that have the highest net benefits. Indeed, the numbers
suggest this already happens. Pundits and commentators would do well to focus
their scrutiny on the cost-benefit analyses underlying agency decisions, rather
than the ultimate length of those decisions themselves. Scholarly critiques of
this part of the administrative process abound,167 and much productive political
164

See William Lehr & Frank R. Lichtenberg, Computer Use and Productivity Growth in
US Federal Government Agencies, 1987–92, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 257, 259, 267 (1998)
(“us[ing] productivity data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Federal
Productivity Measurement Program, which was established for the specific purpose of tracking the labor productivity (real output per employee-hour worked) of federal government
organizations, linked to data on computer use obtained from Computer Intelligence Infocorp
(CII), a private marketing research firm.”).
165 See id. at 267 (reporting data demonstrating that “computerization of public sector workplaces proceeded at a rapid pace [from 1987 to 1992]”).
166 See Max Roser et al., Internet, UNIV. OF OXFORD, https://ourworldindata.org/internet
(2020) (last visited Feb. 11, 2020).
167 See e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9–11 (2004).
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discourse could flow from that debate. For the citizenry, recognizing an overly
burdensome regulatory state, an undoubtedly worthwhile and vital check in a
democratic society, requires more than simply counting the pages of regulations. The results of this study should put some minds at ease, at least with respect to EPA regulations; they should also help better direct our scrutiny in the
future.
On the other hand, the data collected from United States Courts of Appeals
decisions and the Federal Register failed to confirm the insulation hypothesis.
For policymakers, the straightforward implication of that finding sounds obvious—simply making a rule longer will likely not better protect it from judicial
review. It is the more nuanced, and admittedly unproved, implication that
should cause them pause—perhaps devoting pages and pages in the Federal
Register to exhaustively detailing the rationale for a given rule is not an efficient use of pulp, ink, and human resources. The empirical result (the lack of a
statistically significant finding) should also motivate scholars and commentators to further probe the utility of process requirements (judicially, legislatively,
or administratively imposed) that add length and detail to Federal Register entries, particularly in the “Statement of Basis and Reasons.” This work’s author
looks forward to joining the debate in that arena. Finally, court and agency
watchers in the public should take the results here as a reminder that the size of
a rule reveals little about its propensity to last—courts invalidate short, simple
rules and long, complex ones.
VIII.STUDY LIMITATIONS
As with any empirical study, significant and notable limitations cabin the
results of this work. Two prominent limitations derive directly from the study’s
design, while a third is extrinsic to the data collection and analysis.
First, and most prominently, the samples used for this study were confined
by design to environmental regulations, specifically those promulgated by the
EPA. The motivations for that decision to narrowly define the scope of the data
collection range from the purely practical (resource constraints) to the theoretical (EPA regulations attract scholarly and popular attention because they epitomize the sweeping reach and powerful impact of the modern administrative
state). Though intentional, this sharp focus on the EPA did not come without
drawbacks, the most significant of which clouds the results with respect to one
untested explanation for the growing length of regulations. Scholars have argued that environmental problems, particularly those addressed by our laws,
have become more complex over time.168 One might surmise that regulations
168

Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of
Law and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 252 (1991) (“The first wave of environmental legislation was directed at the problems that were easiest to see and resolve. Burning rivers and lakes suffocating from massive algal blooms were obvious targets for remediation. The smog covering the nation’s urban areas and the odors emanating from open
solid waste dumps cried out for attention. . . . Just as the problems seemed obvious, so did
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have responded to the increasing complexity of their targets by becoming longer and more complicated themselves. This study, limited as it is to EPA regulations, could not control for, nor measure, that potential effect.
Another limitation follows from the design choice to focus on Federal Register entries as the measure of rule length, rather than Code of Federal Regulations provisions. Looking at words, rather than pages, and at parts making up
the Code of Federal Regulations, rather than rules published in the Federal
Register, provides another measure of the observed trend. However, that measure paints a much noisier picture, as Figure 10 shows.169 Individual data points
vary more sporadically from year to year due to the fact that some years saw
fewer (or even no) new parts added to the Code of Federal Regulations, and the
trend appears consistent with that observed in the Federal Register data. However, the regression model results suggest a more complicated picture. In addition to these analysis challenges, the data collection regarding the number of
words added by a given rulemaking would have proved far more time consuming, particularly for rules that have since been removed from, or even simply
revised in, the Code of Federal Regulations. For those reasons, this study was
designed with a Federal Register focus, acknowledging that it opens the results
to an additional avenue of critique.
FIGURE 10

the most effective solutions. The early legislation required EPA and the states to prohibit or
control industrial and municipal discharges from both stationary and mobile sources, typically by imposing end-of-pipe controls. A direct cause and effect relationship between compliance with these limitations on pollutant discharges and a cleaner environment was simply
assumed. Twenty years later, these early assessments of the nature of both environmental
problems and their resolution seem naive.”).
169
Data derived from McLaughlin & Sherouse, supra note 12.
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MODEL SUMMARY
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

1
.524a
.275
a. Predictors: (Constant), Words Per new CFR Part

.253

Std. Error of the
Estimate
13.009

An extrinsic limitation to the findings in this study bears repeating170 because of the findings on the socially beneficial hypothesis. The benefits and
costs estimates that comprise one half of the data set come directly from EPA
Regulatory Impact Analyses. Those analyses were necessarily performed at the
time of the rulemakings they concern, predicting the benefits and costs to society. Unfortunately for the purposes of this empirical analysis,171 the EPA has not
maintained a consistent methodology with respect to calculating and modeling
costs and benefits of rulemaking. Changes in that methodology over time make
comparisons of cost-benefit figures over time less valid. The fact that this study
uses a sample of exclusively CAA rules at least controls for variation in valuation and methodology across environmental media and corresponding EPA offices (e.g., air, water, solid waste). Nonetheless, any differences in methods
over time unavoidably to some degree infect the results here.
CONCLUSION
The findings reported here suggest that while EPA regulations have been
getting longer, they have also been conferring more benefits on society. If
EPA’s activity reflects the larger trend across all agencies, which seems a reasonable assumption, we need not worry so much about the increasing length of
individual rules. Despite these findings, politicians will certainly continue to
take photo opportunities with stacks of paper. Pundits and commentators will
continue to decry the growing regulatory state. Voters will curse the government bureaucracy and “red tape.” This work should mark the next step in a
more informed debate—a debate for the first time grounded in comprehensive
data and thorough analysis, rather than isolated big numbers and rhetorical theatrics. The findings here should prompt reexamination of administrators’ and
general counsels’ approaches to avoiding judicial review. The findings should
further prompt administrators to direct rule-writing resources on the basis of
cost-benefit analyses, or, perhaps more accurately, should prompt them to at
least acknowledge their existing tendency to unknowingly do so. Future studies
could prompt reforms or reconsiderations in countless other areas. All of this is
based on evidence, the preferred decision-making tool of the thousands of sci170

See supra Section IV.C.
This is not to say EPA has not improved its cost-benefit analysis methodology over time.
It is simply to point out that the inconsistent methodologies somewhat undermine the ability
to compare figures over time, a necessary comparison for the empirical study here.
171
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entific experts that serve in agencies. Empirical study of the work of administrative agencies is vital to the continued success of our system of government,
which remains dependent on their resilient and efficient work.
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